

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of S.S.R. and S.R.R., Minors.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

LEON RANKINS,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

GEORGINA HENRIETTA RANKINS,

Respondent.

In the Matter of S.S.R. and S.R.R., Minors.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

GEORGINA HENRIETTA RANKINS,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

LEON RANKINS,

Respondent.

UNPUBLISHED
May 22, 2003

No. 243431
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-351907

No. 243438
LC No. 97-351907

Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and White and Donofrio, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

In these consolidated appeals, respondents appeal as of right from the trial court order terminating their parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (i), and (j). In both cases, we affirm.

With respect to respondent Leon Rankins, we find the trial court did not clearly err in finding that § 19b(3)(i) was established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); *In re Sours*, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999); *In re Miller*, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). It is undisputed that Mr. Rankins' parental rights to ten other children had been terminated in previous child protection proceedings due to serious and chronic neglect. During those proceedings, Mr. Rankins had been offered services, but he did not comply. Therefore, prior efforts to rehabilitate Mr. Rankins were unsuccessful. Because only one ground is required to terminate parental rights, we need not address Mr. Rankins' arguments with respect to § 19b(3)(g) and (j). Further, the evidence did not show that termination of Mr. Rankins' parental rights was clearly not in the children's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Mr. Rankins remained married to Mrs. Rankins, who had not resolved her serious mental health issues. In addition, the children were not bonded to Mr. Rankins because they had been removed directly from the hospital shortly after their birth.

Respondent Georgina Rankins first argues the trial court should be reversed because it did not bifurcate the jurisdictional and dispositional aspects of the proceedings when it terminated her parental rights at the initial disposition. Respondent mother failed to object below and fails to cite authority in support of her position on appeal. We deem the issue abandoned. *In re Powers*, 208 Mich App 582, 588; 528 NW2d 799 (1995).

In addition, Mrs. Rankins challenges the trial court's findings with respect to the statutory grounds. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that § 19b(3)(i) was established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); *Sours, supra* at 633; *Miller, supra* at 337. It is undisputed that Mrs. Rankins' parental rights to ten other children had been terminated in previous child protection proceedings due to serious and chronic neglect. During those proceedings, Mrs. Rankins had been offered services, but she did not comply. Therefore, prior efforts to rehabilitate Mrs. Rankins were unsuccessful. Because only one ground is required to terminate parental rights, we need not address Mrs. Rankins' arguments with respect to § 19b(3)(g) and (j). Mrs. Rankins does not challenge the trial court's findings with respect to the children's best interests. In any event, the evidence did not show that termination of Mrs. Rankins' parental rights was clearly not in the children's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); *Trejo, supra* at 356-357. As already explained, Mrs. Rankins had not resolved her serious mental health issues, which were the basis for the prior child protective proceedings. In addition, the children were not bonded to Mrs. Rankins because they had been removed directly from the hospital shortly after their birth.

Mrs. Rankins' argument that the termination order is null and void because it failed to list the specific statutory grounds for termination is without merit. The trial court complied with MCR 5.974(G)(3).

Affirmed.

/s/ William C. Whitbeck

/s/ Helene N. White

/s/ Pat M. Donofrio