

**STATE OF MICHIGAN**  
**COURT OF APPEALS**

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In the Matter of JEREMY PRINCE, MATTHEW  
PRINCE, MARK PRINCE and MICHAEL  
PRINCE, Minors

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FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY, f/k/a  
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,

UNPUBLISHED  
June 24, 1997

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

DIANE MICHELLE PRINCE,

No. 198971  
Muskegon Probate Court  
LC No. 91-018342-NA

Respondent-Appellant.

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Before: Gage, P.J., and Reilly and Hoekstra, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right from the probate court order terminating her parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j). We affirm.

Respondent contends that the probate court erred by restricting evidence to events which occurred prior to the date when the petition seeking terminating was filed. However, the probate court's remarks reveal only that it instructed the attorneys to reexamine the relevancy of the evidence being introduced in light of the allegations in the petition and that it would expect objections if irrelevant evidence is introduced. Moreover, the record establishes that evidence on post-petition events was, in fact, introduced after the probate court's remarks. Under these circumstances, we hold that this evidentiary issue was not preserved for appeal because respondent failed to make an offer of proof on the substance or relevancy of any other evidence that she now believes should have been presented. *Orlich v Buxton*, 22 Mich App 96, 100; 177 NW2d 184 (1970).

Further, we are not persuaded that any plain error warranting relief has been demonstrated. *People v Grant*, 445 Mich 535; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). Although the probate court may receive all

relevant and material evidence, MCR 5.974(F)(2), the court's written opinion on termination makes it clear that the evidence introduced relative to post-petition events would not affect its findings on whether respondent is now, or will later be, able to parent the children. We hold that the probate court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination in §§ 3(c)(i) and 3(g) of MCL 712A.19b(3); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3) were established by clear and convincing evidence, even when the evidence introduced on post-petition events is considered. MCR 5.974(I); *In re Miller*, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). In view thereof, we find it unnecessary to consider respondent's arguments concerning subsection (j) because they are not outcome determinative. *In re Hildebrant*, 216 Mich App 384, 389; 548 NW2d 715 (1996). Only one statutory ground for termination must be met by clear and convincing evidence. *In re Jackson*, 199 Mich App 22, 25; 501 NW2d 182 (1993). Further, we find no clear error in the probate court's ultimate decision to order termination. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); *In re Hall-Smith*, \_\_\_ Mich App \_\_\_ ; \_\_\_ NW2d \_\_\_ (Docket No. 195833, issued 3/25/97).

Affirmed.

/s/ Hilda R. Gage  
/s/ Maureen Pulte Reilly  
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra